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AN ANALYSIS OF DURRETTAND ITS IMPACT
ON REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
FORECLOSURES: SOME PROPOSED
MODIFICATIONS
WILLIAM H. HENNING t
Section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code empowers a bankruptcy
trustee to avoidfraudulent trans/ers of the debtor's assets if the debtor
was insolvent at the time of the transfer. Since 1980, a number offed-
eral courts have allowed trustees in bankruptcy to avoid properly con-
ducted foreclosure sales of a debtor's pledaged collateral when the
collateral was soldfor less than seventy percent of itsfair market value.
These courts have based their decisions on the theory that the transfers
involved in these sales are fraudulent conveyances. This theory has
been the subject of vigorous opposition from mortgage holders and
other secured lenders. Professor Henning argues that the theory is a
proper and useful toolfor trustees because it permits the trustee to re-
capture equity in the collateral that otherwise would be lost from the
debtor's estate. He concludes, however, that certain modifcations
should be made to the theory to prevent inequities to the secured lender,
the debtor, and any third-party purchasers of the collateral.
From the standpoint of the typical secured creditor, one of the most im-
portant aspects of a consensual security interest in real or personal property is
its capacity to withstand a challenge by a trustee in bankruptcy. Most credi-
tors are painfully aware that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy
Code),' like its predecessor (Bankruptcy Act), 2 empowers trustees to avoid se-
curity interests in a variety of situations. The trustee may defeat a security
interest that would be subordinated under state law to the rights of a judicial
lien creditor or a bona fide purchaser of real property.3 He also may be able to
defeat the creditor's security interest by invoking the rules governing preferen-
tial transfers.4 Secured creditors have learned to anticipate these challenges
and to take steps to minimize these risks.
Recently, however, courts have approved a novel theory that few secured
creditors anticipated. This theory views a postdefault, prebankruptcy disposi-
tion of collateral for less than seventy percent of its fair market value, that
t Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. J.D. 1976, University of Tennessee;
LL.M. 1982, University of Illinois.
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982)) [hereinafter referred to as Bankruptcy Code].
2. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1-1255 (1976)) repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1982).
4. Id. § 547.
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occurs while the debtor is insolvent, as a fraudulent conveyance which can be
avoided under section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.5 This theory can be
used by a trustee, or by a debtor exercising the rights of a trustee, to set aside a
disposition occurring within one year prior to the commencement of bank-
ruptcy even if the secured creditor has complied meticulously with state fore-
closure laws. The theory originated with a decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Durrett v. Washington National Insurance
Co., 6 and has been applied primarily as a vehicle for avoiding foreclosures on
real property. No conceptual barriers, however, prevent its application to
foreclosures on personalty. Indeed, the theory recently was applied for the
first time to a private sale under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
7
Similar decisions are certain to follow.
Durrett sent shock waves through the real estate bar, which has opposed
the decision actively in the courts8 and has promoted legislation designed to
overrule it.9 The controversy focuses on two factors-the long period of uncer-
5. Id § 548(a). See generally Note, Noniudicial Foreclosure under Deed of Trust May Be a
Fraudulent Transfer ofBankrupt's Property, 47 Mo. L. Rv. 345 (1982) (noting evolution of dispo-
sition as fraudulent conveyance theory).
6. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
7. See Calairo v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank (In re Ewing), 33 Bankr. 288 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1983), rev'a 36 Bankr. 476 (W.D. Pa. 1984). The reversal was based on a misapplication of the
law. Ewing is discussed infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
8. For example, in Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Co. (In re Madrid), 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.
1984), a case that rejected the Durrett analysis, the American Land Title Association, the Mort-
gage Brokers Institute, the American Council of Life Insurance, the American College of Real
Estate Lawyers, the California Bankers Association, and the California Bank Clearing House As-
sociation filed amicus briefs. See Alden, Gross & Borowitz, RealProperty Foreclosure as a Fraud-
ulent Conveyance: Proposalsfor Solving the Durrett Problem; 38 Bus. LAW. 1605, 1607 n.8 (1983).
9. See Gold, Proposed Amendment to Clarfy Status of Property Bought in Foreclosure,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 1982, at 23, col. I (proposal to amend § 548); Summary ofAction of the House of
Delegates, 1983 A.B.A. PRoc. 1, 31 (resolution endorsing amendment to state fraudulent convey-
ance law and to § 548).
An amendment to § 548 that equated reasonably equivalent value with any amount paid by a
secured party or third-party purchaser at a good faith foreclosure was introduced in the Senate in
1983. See S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 360, 129 CONG. REc. 5972 (1983). The Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (amending I I
U.S.C. §§ 101-1113, 28 U.S.C §§ 109, 151-158, 371, 1334-1452, 1930 (1982)), however, does not
include this provision.
In addition, the American Bar Association Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
urged that the Drafting Committee to Revise the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act include a
provision abrogating Durrett. This would prevent trustees from circumventing § 548 and ob-
taining the same result under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982). Section 544(b) allows the trustee to avoid
any transfer that could be avoided under state or federal nonbankruptcy law by a creditor holding
an unsecured claim. The trustee's power is derivative in nature and requires that such a creditor
actually exist.
This effort culminated when the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws at its Summer 1984 conference adopted a new Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) to
supercede the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA). Section 3(b) of the UFTA rejects
Durrett by providing that "a person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an
interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale
or execution of a power of sale... under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement." This
provision would not affect transfers such as strict foreclosure, the taking of a deed in lieu of fore-
closure, or termination of a lease in which the property's value is not tested by sale. Section 8(g)
of the UFTA, however, would prevent Durrett's application to lease terminations or nonsale dis-
positions under the Uniform Commercial Code by specifically providing as a defense that such
transfers are not voidable.
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tainty about title following foreclosure and the chilling effect that a de facto
federal right of redemption could have on secured lending and participation at
foreclosure sales. Much of this criticism is overstated. As this Article demon-
strates, provisions already exist in the Bankruptcy Code that adequately pro-
tect secured lenders.' 0 Moreover, the manner in which real estate foreclosure
sales presently are conducted frequently leads to minimal participation and a
sacrifice of part or all of the debtor's equity. Thus, it is unlikely that any
"chill" generated by Durrett will worsen this situation significantly, particu-
larly since roughly half the states already permit statutory postsale
redemption. 1
Although these criticisms are overstated, application of the Durrett analy-
sis presents some problems. First, the period of uncertainty following foreclo-
sure is excessive.12 Second, application of the Bankruptcy Code's remedies
following avoidance can lead to inequities, particularly with respect to third-
party purchasers. 13 Third, the rules governing Article 9 foreclosures are
designed to be more protective of the debtor's equity than real property laws.
Furthermore, no state permits postsale redemption of personalty. 14 Thus, the
potential for an adverse effect on bidding is greater for personalty than it is for
realty. Last, Durrett may not sufficiently recapture the debtor's equity for the
estate. If current inequities are eliminated, there is no reason to allow up to
thirty percent of the collateral's fair market value to escape by arbitrarily lim-
iting avoidance to foreclosures in which less than seventy percent of that value
has been received.
Durrett advances one of the primary goals of bankruptcy by permitting
the trustee to recapture the debtor's equity for the benefit of unsecured credi-
tors. To the extent that it achieves this goal without substantial prejudice to
secured lenders and subsequent purchasers, it should be encouraged. Accord-
ingly, this Article argues that the basic premise of Durrett should be retained,
but that the theory should be modified by new legislation 15 designed to in-
crease the potential benefits to the estate while minimizing the doctrine's nega-
tive consequences.
I. BACKGROUND TO DUPRE
The Anglo-American law of fraudulent conveyances generally is traced to
an English act known as the Statute of Elizabeth.16 This Act was designed to
10. See infra notes 134-48 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 96-115 and accompanying text
12. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 118-33 and accompanying text.
15. A major revision of federal bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, does not address the issue directly. For a
discussion of the impact of this legislation, see infra note 79.
16. Statute of Elizabeth, 1571, 13 Eliz. ch. 5. The original act, which was passed to facilitate
the collection of judgments, later was supplemented by an act designed to protect purchasers of
real property. Statute of Elizabeth, 1584-85, 27 EL ch. 4. Avoidance of fraudulent conveyances
existed in Roman law and the Statute of Elizabeth had antecedents in English law. See D.
1985]
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avoid 17 voluntary conveyances made by debtors with the specific intent of hin-
dering, delaying, or defrauding creditors. Because of the difficulty of proving
subjective intent, the English courts allowed a creditor to prove intent by dem-
onstrating the existence of circumstances that suggested the presence of fraud.
These objective manifestations of intent, such as conveyances to family mem-
bers or conveyances by insolvents, came to be known as "badges of fraud." t
American jurisdictions either enacted legislation similar to the Statute of
Elizabeth or received the law of fraudulent conveyances as part of their com-
mon-law heritage. By the early twentieth century, however, this body of law
was in a confused, disorganized state.' 9 In 1918 the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act (UFCA).20 For present purposes, the most important provi-
sion of the UFCA is section 4, which renders conveyances for less than a fair
consideration made by persons who are insolvent, or who are rendered insol-
vent by the conveyance, voidable irrespective of intent. Fair consideration is
defined in market terms and means the giving, in good faith, of a "fair
equivalent" for the property conveyed, including the satisfaction of an antece-
dent debt.2
1
Section 4 of the UFCA was intended to eliminate any legal presumptions
regarding intent. Prior to its enactment, some states adopted the position that
any voluntary conveyance by a debtor was conclusively presumed fraudulent
as to existing creditors irrespective of the debtor's overall financial condition.22
This view was adopted primarily to invalidate gifts by insolvents whose con-
veyances were harmful to creditors but whose intent was donative rather than
fraudulent.23 The rule, however, was so broad that it could invalidate a gift by
a solvent debtor who later became insolvent for unrelated reasons.
Other states rejected the legal-presumption analysis and adopted the posi-
MOORE, A TREATISE ON FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND CREDITORS' REMEDIES AT LAW AND
IN EQUITY (1908).
17. The Act declared the proscribed conveyances to be "clearly and utterly void," but as the
law developed such transactions were viewed as merely voidable by injured creditors. See 1 G.
GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § I ll (rev. ed. 1940).
18. The concept of "badges of fraud" dates from Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 80b, 76 Eng. Rep.
809 (1601).
19. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT (1918). The
Commissioners attributed the confusion to the absence of a well-defined concept of insolvency,
the diverse rules determining the parties with standing to challenge a particular conveyance, and
the efforts by some states to stretch the concept of intent to avoid conveyances-such as gifts by
insolvents--4hat were harmful to creditors but were made without actual intent.
20. Twenty-five states have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. See UNi,
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. (Supp. 1983).
21. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 3(a), 7 U.L.A. 444 (1968).
22. This presumption of law originated in the United States with Chancellor Kent's opinion
in Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns. 481 (N.Y. 1818). In 1829 New York enacted a statute declaring
that the presence of fraud always is a factual issue. N.Y. Rev. Stat., pt. 11, c. 7, tit. 3 (1829). Other
states, however, continued to follow Chancellor Kent's view. See, e.g., Unger v. Mayer, 105 N.J.
Eq. 253, 147 A. 509 (NJ. Ch. 1929), aff'a4 107 N.J. Eq. 185, 151 A. 907 (N.J. 1930). There was a
significant split among the states at the time the UFCA was adopted. See I G. GLENN, supra note
17, § 268.
23. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, UNir. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT (1918).
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tion that the presence of fraud always was an issue of fact to be proved by
demonstrating the existence of badges of fraud.24 By eliminating the intent
requirement, section 4 of the UFCA established a new category of "construc-
tive fraud." This category avoided the excesses possible in the legal-presump-
tion states and simplified the proof required to avoid a conveyance in the
factual-issue states. Section 4, however, was not intended to achieve results
substantially different from those obtained under the Statute of Elizabeth. In-
stead, it was intended to be a simplified codification of one of the most impor-
tant badges of fraud, insolvency of the debtor.
2s
Although the UFCA dispensed with the necessity of proving intent when
each of the section 4 elements was present, it was consistent with edsting law
in that it focused primarily on voluntary conveyances. The UFCA did not
specifically exclude involuntary transfers from the definition of "convey-
ance,"26 but there is no reason to believe that it was drafted with such transfers
in mind.27 Section 4 refers to conveyances "made. . . by a person who is or
will be thereby rendered insolvent. ' 28 Narrowly construing this provision to
24. See, e.g., Butcher v. Cantor, 185 F. 945 (E.D.N.Y. 1911); Kingsbury v. Christy, 21 Ariz.
559, 192 P. 114 (1920); Webb's Trustee v. Lynchburg Shoe Co., 106 Va. 726, 56 S.E. 581 (1907).
25. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE AC (1918). See
generally McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46 HARv. L. REv.
404 (1933) (§ 4 intended as external test of fraud).
26. "Conveyance" is defined in § I as "every payment of money, assignment, release, trans-
fer, lease, mortgage or pledge of tangible or intangible property, and also the creation of any lien
or encumbrance." UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 1, 7 U.L.A. 426 (1968).
27. It is unclear whether an involuntary transfer of an interest in property would be voidable
under the UFCA, the earlier state statutes, or common law. 4 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY § 548.01 (15th ed. 1983). The history of the law of fraudulent conveyances, however,
suggests that voluntary action by the debtor is necessary for the conveyance to be voidable. Pro-
fessor Glenn, who did not deal specifically with the voluntariness issue, defined fraudulent con-
veyances as follows: "Thus the touchstone is not a thing of form, nor is our inquiry bounded by
the technicalities that attach to the terms 'conveyance' or 'transfer.' The real test of a fraudulent
conveyance is the unjust diminution of the debtor's estate." 1 G. GLENN, supra note 17, § 195, at
348. Although this definition is sufficiently broad to encompass involuntary transfers, virtually
every mode of transfer described by Glenn involves voluntary action or at least indifference evi-
denced by failure to assert a known defense by the debtor.
There is little direct authority supporting the view that only voluntary conveyances may be
avoided under the UFCA. An unusual example is Merriam v. Wimpfheimer, 25 F. Supp. 405
(S.D.N.Y. 1938), in which a bankruptcy trustee relied on § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act to set aside
a foreclosure sale of pledged stock. The trustee's rights were derived from state law and the court
in denying his petition held, without citing authority, that New York's fraudulent conveyance law,
the UFCA, was limited to voluntary conveyances. The voluntariness limitation usually is stated
in dictum or may be ascertained only by inference. See, e.g., Merrillat v. Hooker, 33 App. D.C.
192 (1909); Sheffield Progressive, Inc. v. Kingston Tool Co., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 47, 405 N.E.2d 985
(1980); Kerr v. Blaine, 49 Mont. 602, 144 P. 566 (1914).
There is ample authority that a judgment or foreclosure can be avoided, but the cases invari-
ably involve collusive-and therefore voluntary-action by the debtor, or at least indifference and
failure to assert a known defense. See, eg., Martin v. General Fin. Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 438, 48
Cal. Rptr. 773 (1966); Bernero v. Bernero, 363 Ill. 328, 2 N.E.2d 317 (1936); Sheffield Progressive,
Inc. v. Kingston Tool Co., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 47, 405 N.E.2d 985 (1980); Zakheim v. Dry Harbor
Homes, Inc., 245 A.D. 769, 281 N.Y.S. 153 (1935); cf. Security Nat'l Bank v. Lowrie, 59 S.D. 102,
238 N.W. 304 (1931) (conveyance not set aside because of insufficient evidence); see also 1 G.
GLENN, supra note 17, § 214(a) (collusive foreclosure of a pledge or mortgage is a fraudulent
conveyance).
28. UNiF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE Acr § 4, 7 U.L.A. 470 (1968) (emphasis added). For
further discussion of the significance of this language, see infra note 47.
1985]
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require debtor participation is consistent with the general thrust of fraudulent
conveyance law-to invalidate deliberate actions taken by debtors that un-
fairly interfere with the expectations of their creditors.
The Chandler Act of 193829 incorporated concepts derived from the
UFCA into the nation's bankruptcy laws. Like section 4 of the UFCA, section
67d(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended by the Chandler Act, rendered
transfers fraudulent "as to creditors existing at the time of such transfers...
if made. . . without fair consideration by a debtor who is or will be thereby
rendered insolvent, without regard to his actual intent .... ,,3o The trustee's
rights under this provision applied to conveyances within one year prior to the
commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. 31 Section 67d(l)(e)(1), like sec-
tion 3 of the UFCA, defined "fair consideration" in market terms by stating
that consideration was fair if "in good faith, in exchange and as a fair
equivalent therefore, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is
satisfied."3
2
Unlike the UFCA, however, the Bankruptcy Act specifically defined the
term "transfer" to include both voluntary and involuntary transfers.33 Since a
mortgage foreclosure sale-whether judicial or nonjudicial-is an involuntary
transfer of the debtor's interest in the encumbered property, the combination
of the deletion of the intent requirement of the UFCA and the expansive defi-
nition of transfer in the Bankruptcy Act set the stage for the novel theory em-
braced in Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co.
34
Prior to 1938 the Bankruptcy Act's definition of transfer did not specifi-
cally include involuntary events.35 Although the Chandler Act amended the
definition by adding the language covering involuntary transfers,3 6 it is un-
likely that this change was related directly to the fraudulent conveyance issue.
The definition was changed to make it sufficiently broad to cover the various
contexts in which the term was used in the Act. For example, section 6037
dealt with preferential transfers and permitted the trustee to avoid certain liens
arising from legal or equitable proceedings against the debtor. To effectuate
the purpose of section 60, the creation of these liens had to fit within the defini-
29. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (repealed
1978)).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 107d(2)(a) (1976) (repealed 1978).
31. The trustee could have circumvented the one-year limitation by invoking the rights de-
rived from state law pursuant to § 70 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1976) (repealed
1978). The same result can be achieved under § 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. See supra note 9.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 107d(l)(e)(1) (1976) (repealed 1978).
33. Id § 1(30) (repealed 1978).
34. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
35. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 1(25), 30 Stat. 544, 545 (repealed 1978). Prior
to 1938 the courts had concluded that a transfer could be accomplished through legal proceedings;
the Chandler Act simply clarified the law in this respect. See I W. COLLIER, supra note 27, § 1.30
(14th ed. 1974).
36. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1(30), 52 Stat. 840, 842 (codified at I I U.S.C. § 1(30)
(1976)) (repealed 1978).




Although Durrett was decided under the Bankruptcy Act, most subse-
quent decisions have been based on the Bankruptcy Code. Section 548(a)(2)
of the Code is substantially the same as former section 67d 39 and section
101(48) continues to define "transfer" to include involuntary transfers.4° The
Code also continues to define consideration in market terms by permitting the
avoidance of transfers for "less than a reasonably equivalent value."' 4 1 Thus,
the Bankruptcy Code lends itself to the same analysis employed by the court
of appeals in Durrett.
38. The conclusion that the change in the definition of transfer was not related directly to
fraudulent conveyances is supported by the legislative history.
The reason for the changes in this definition are that section 60, dealing with preferences,
speaks of transfers and judgments; section 67, dealing with liens and fraudulent trans-
fers, speaks of liens, conveyances, transfers, assignments, encumbrances, levies, judg-
ments and attachments; and section 70(c) dealing with the avoidance by the trustee of
transfers, uses merely the term "transfer." In order to achieve uniformity, the revised
terminology of these sections, wherever possible, is restricted to the latter term. It there-
fore becomes necessary to expand the phraseology of this definition, in order to make
certain that it shall include the full scope of all of the terms presently employed in the
sections cited.
H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1937); see also J. HANNA & J. MCLAUGHLIN, THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1898 As AMENDED INCLUDING THE CHANDLER ACT OF 1938, at 5 (1939)
(definition added to promote uniformity and brevity in the Bankruptcy Act).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982) states:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or
any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year
before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor-
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer
or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation
was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business, or was about to engage in business or a transac-
tion, for which any property remaining with the debtor was unreasonably small capital;
or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that
would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
The cases decided after Durrett invariably have relied on the grounds enumerated in
§ 548(a)(2)(A) and § 548(a)(2)(B)(i).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1982) defined transfer to include "every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property, or with
an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest." Id. (emphasis added).
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 in § 421(i) amended this defini-
tion to include foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption. The impact of this change is
discussed infra note 79. The 1984 amendments also renumbered the definitional section. "Trans-
fer" now is defined in § 101(48).
41. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1982). Section 67d(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act required "fair
consideration." Consideration was fair when it was equivalent in value and given in good faith.
Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 67d(2)(a), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 107d(l)(e)(1)
(1976) (repealed 1978)). The Bankruptcy Code deleted the good faith requirement; it requires
only market equivalence. The Bankruptcy Act's good faith requirement imposed liability on in-
siders who had given a fair equivalent and whose interests could not be attacked under the prefer-
ence provisions due to the limited avoidance period. See, eag., Burroughs v. Fields, 546 F.2d 215
(7th Cir. 1976). Deletion of the good faith requirement was accompanied by an increase in the
preference period to one year in the case of insiders. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1932).
1985]
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II. DURRETT AND CONCURRING CASES
In Durrett, a trustee sold real property with a fair market value of
$200,000 under a power of sale clause in a deed of trust to a third-party pur-
chaser who bid the amount of the debt, $115,400. The deed of trust had been
executed and recorded eight years earlier. Durrett commenced proceedings
under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. In his capacity as a debtor in pos-
session, he sought to set aside the foreclosure sale on the ground that it consti-
tuted a fraudulent conveyance under section 67d.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas held
that there had been a transfer within the one-year avoidance period but that a
fair consideration had been received at the sale.42 The court of appeals agreed
that a section 67d "transfer" had occurred at the foreclosure sale43 but re-
versed on the consideration issue and held that the sale was voidable. The
court noted that the price received at the sale was only 57.7 percent of the
property's fair market value and stated that it was unaware of any decision in
which a transfer of real property for less than 70 percent of fair market value
had withstood attack under section 67d.44 The case was remanded with in-
structions that the district court deal with the property in a manner that pro-
tected the purchaser's interest.
The purchaser had argued that section 67d only applied to transfers made
by the debtor. Although the full extent of the purchaser's position is unclear
from the opinion, he apparently contended that a noncollusive sale by a third
party was outside the scope of section 67d even if it constituted a transfer for
bankruptcy purposes. The court of appeals, however, did not focus on this
argument. Instead, the court limited its analysis to whether there had been a
transfer within the avoidance period. Even though legal title to the property
had been transferred to the trustee eight years earlier, Durrett had retained the
right to possession until the foreclosure sale. The court cited Collier on Bank-
ruptcy for the proposition that section 1(30) " 'covers not only alienations of
title but includes surrender of possession.' -45 Thus, the court concluded that
there had been a transfer; the court ignored the question whether section 67d
applied to a transfer by a nondebtor.
A year later, the court of appeals reaffirmed its Durrett holding in Abram-
42. 460 F. Supp. 52, 54 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
43. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 204.
44. Id at 203. Durrett has been cited as establishing a rule that a transfer can be avoided
during the avoidance period for lack of reasonably equivalent value if the foreclosure sale brings
less than 70% of the collateral's fair market value. See, e.g., Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v.
Wheeler (Inre Wheeler), 34 Bankr. 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); Coleman v. Home Say. Ass'n (In
re Coleman), 21 Bankr. 832 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982); Wickham v. United Am. Bank in Knoxville
(In re Thompson), 18 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982). The actual holding in Durrett is much
more limited; the court merely suggested a standard equal to 70% of fair market value. Nonethe-
less, for purposes of convenience this Article will refer to Durrett as establishing a 70% rule.




son v. Lakewood Bank and Trust Co.4 6 This decision is most notable for the
strong dissent of Judge Clark,47 who adopted the purchaser's position in Dur-
rett and argued that a mortgage foreclosure is not a transfer by a debtor and
therefore is not governed by section 67d. According to Judge Clark, the Dur-
rett rule also is bad policy since it casts a cloud on the purchaser's title and, as
a result, tends to depress the already low prices at foreclosure sales.48 The
effect is to increase deficiencies resulting from foreclosures.49
Durrett represented a radical departure from prior law.50 The decision
effectively created a federal right of redemption that could be exercised by
filing a bankruptcy petition within one year following foreclosure. Because an
action under section 548 can be brought until the earlier of two years after the
appointment of a trustee or the time the case is closed or dismissed, the period
of uncertainty for the purchaser can exceed three years.5 ' Since a trustee may
46. 647 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981). Like Durrett, Abrarnon was decided under § 67d of the
Bankruptcy Act.
47. Id. at 549 (Clark, J., dissenting). Judge Clark based his position on the literal wording of
§ 67d, which refers to "[elvery transfer ... by a debtor' (emphasis added). This language can be
traced to § 4 of the UFCA. See supra text accompanying note 28.
Judge Clark's argument might have been strengthened by noting the historical uses of the
fraudulent conveyance theory and by contrasting § 67d's use of "transfer. . . by the debtor" with
the language of § 60a defining a preference as "a transfer .. of any of the property of a debtor"
(emphasis added). This argument, however, is diluted under the Bankruptcy Code because§ 548( ) permits the trustee to avoid "any transfer of an interest of the debtor" (emphasis added).
There is, however, no indicatio n the legislative history that Congress intended to expand the
scope of fraudulent conveyance theory by this change. Most likely, the change reflects a desire to
achieve uniformity with other sections, such as § 547. For further discussion of this issue, see infra
note 84.
48. Abramson, 647 F.2d at 550 (Clark, J., dissenting). As in Durrett, the foreclosure in Ab-
ra'nson was a nonjudicial sale pursuant to a power of sale clause in a deed of trust. Id. at 548.
49. Absent unusual circumstances, deficiencies are discharged in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.
§ 727 (1982). Judge Clark undoubtedly was concerned that Durrett would spill over from its
bankruptcy setting and increase deficiencies for all debtors whose property was subjected to fore-
closure.
There are limitations on the right to a deficiency in a number of states. See G. OSBORNE, G.
NELSON, & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 8.1-8.3 (1979); Nelson, Deciency Judg-
ments after Real Estate Foreclosures in Missourk" Some Modest Proposals, 47 Mo. L. REv. 151,
152-55 (1982); Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in Mortgage
Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 843 (1980).
50. Several decisions prior to Durrett had concluded that a noncollusive foreclosure sale that
brings less than fair market value was not a fraudulent conveyance. See, e.g., Merriam v. Wimpf-
heimer, 25 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (foreclosure on pledged stock); Pierce v. Pierce, 16 Cal.
App. 375, 117 P. 580 (1911) (foreclosure on real property); Harris v. Wagshal, 343 A.2d 283 (D.C.
1975) (foreclosure on pledged security).
One case decided under the Bankrupcty Act supports Durrett. Darby v. Atkinson (In re Fer-
ris), 415 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Okla. 1976), involved termination of a long-term lease prior to bank-
ruptcy for nonpayment of rent. The lessees had constructed a twin theatre and restaurant complex
on the land and termination of the lease involved a forfeiture of these improvements. The court
determined that the lessor had terminated the lease properly under Oklahoma law, but had not
given fair consideration for the leasehold. Accordingly, it avoided the termination under § 67d.
The court undoubtedly was influenced by the fact that the lessees forfeited roughly $129,000 eq-
uity in the complex.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) (1982). The risk to the transferee can be extended an additional year
since only the avoidability of the transfer is determined in an action. Id. § 548(a)(2). The trustee
will recover the property itself, id. § 550(a), which has its own statute of limitations. The trustee
may not commence an action, id. § 550(a), "after the earlier of-(1) one year after the avoidance of
the transfer on account of which recovery under this section is sought; and (2) the time the case is
closed or dismissed." Id. § 550(c). Ordinarily, the trustee will couple an avoidance action under
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not be appointed in a Chapter 11 proceeding, the debtor in possession theoreti-
cally can bring an action at any time during the pendency of the bankruptcy
proceedings. 52 Even in a Chapter 7 proceeding the appointment of a trustee
may not occur until a considerable time after the case is commenced.
5 3
Durrett has been followed, sometimes reluctantly,54 in a number of real
property cases. The theory has been approved for nonjudicial foreclosures, 55
judicial foreclosures, 56 execution sales,57 and strict foreclosures. 58 It has been
used by trustees in Chapter 7 proceedings, 59 by debtors in possession in Chap-
ter 11 proceedings, 60 and by debtors in Chapter 13 proceedings. 61 The theory
§ 548 and a recovery action under § 550 so that the additional limitation period is irrelevant. See 4
W. COLLIER, supra note 27, § 550.02, at 550-5 n.5.
52. The two-year limitation of§ 546(a)(1) is not triggered unless a trustee is appointed under
§ 1104. Chapter 11 is organized on the assumption that the debtor will remain in possession and a
trustee is not appointed except on request of a party in interest. Cf. Alsop v. Alaska (In re Alsop),
14 Bankr. 982 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981) (statement as to interrelation of §§ 546(a)(1) and 1104 is
dictum), aff'd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
53. Election of a trustee in a Chapter 7 proceeding is governed by II U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
54. See Coleman v. Home Sav. Ass'n (In re Coleman), 21 Bankr. 832, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1982), in which the judge acknowledged that he was bound by Durrelt, but approved of Judge
Clark's dissent in .4bramson.
55. See Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 34 Bankr. 818, 820 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1983); Cooper v. Smith (In re Smith), 24 Bankr. 19, 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982); Gill-
man v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982);
Wickham v. United Am. Bank in Knoxville (In re Thompson), 18 Bankr. 67, 70 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1982) (relief denied because reasonably equivalent value given); Marshall v. Spindale Say.
& Loan Ass'n (In re Marshall), 15 Bankr. 738 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1981); see also Rosner v. Worces-
ter (In re Worcester), 28 Bankr. 910, 914 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983) (debtor not insolvent at time of
transfer but foreclosure set aside on other grounds); Alsop v. Alaska (In re Alsop), 14 Bankr. 982,
987 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981) (court held no transfer within avoidance period), aff'd, 22 Bankr.
1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
56. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Bismarck, Inc. v. Hulm (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d 323
(8th Cir. 1984); United Penn Bank v. Dudley (In re Dudley), 38 Bankr. 666 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1984) (relief denied because reasonably equivalent value given); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones (In
re Jones), 20 Bankr. 988 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
57. See Frank v. Berlin (In re Frank), 39 Bankr. 166 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); Richard v.
Tempest (In re Richard), 26 Bankr. 560 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983); Smith v. American Consumer Fin.
Corp. (In re Smith), 21 Bankr. 345 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982).
58. See Carr v. Demusis (In re Carr), 34 Bankr. 653 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983); Berge v. Sweet
(In re Berge), 33 Bankr. 642 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983); Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc, v.
Equitable Trust Co. (In re Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 36 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1982) (applying Vermont law).
59. See Richard v. Tempest (In re Richard), 26 Bankr. 560 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983); Cooper v.
Smith (In re Smith), 24 Bankr. 19 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co.
(In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); Wickham v. United Am. Bank in Knox-
ville (In re Thompson), 18 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
60. See Frank v. Berlin (In re Frank), 39 Bankr. 166 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); Berge v. Sweet
(In re Berge), 33 Bankr. 642 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983); Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc. v.
Equitable Trust Co., (In re Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 36 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1982); Alsop v. Alaska (In re Alsop), 14 Bankr. 982 (D. Alaska 1981), aff'd, 22 Bankr. 434 (D.
Alaska 1982).
61. SeeUnited Penn Bank v. Dudley (In reDudley), 38 Bankr. 666 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1984);
Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 34 Bankr. 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983);
Carr v. Demusis (In re Carr), 34 Bankr. 653 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983); Rosner v. Worcester (In re
Worcester), 28 Bankr. 910 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983); Coleman v. Home Say. Ass'n (In re Coleman),
21 Bankr. 832 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982); Smith v. American Consumer Fin. Corp. (In re Smith), 21
Bankr. 345 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones (In re Jones), 20 Bankr. 988




has not yet been applied when a deed has been taken by the mortgagee in lieu
of foreclosure, but there is no doubt of its applicability in such a case since
there is not even a pretense that the property's value has been tested by sale.
Two significant cases, however, reject the Durrett analysis, at least in part.
III. TRANSFER ISSUES: THE ALSOP AND MADRID CASES
4. In re Alsop
The first case to differ with Durrett was A/sop v. Alaska (In re A/sop).
6 2
Alsop involved an attempt by a debtor in possession to set aside a nonjudicial
sale under a deed of trust. The sale occurred two days before the commence-
ment of Chapter 11 proceedings, but the deed of trust had been executed and
properly recorded two years earlier. Although the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Alaska acknowledged that the foreclosure sale fit within the defini-
tion of transfer in the Bankruptcy Code,63 it held that this definition must be
interpreted in light of section 548(d)(1),64 which establishes special rules for
determining the time of a transfer. Under this latter section, a transfer is
deemed to occur when it becomes so far perfected under state or nonban-
kruptcy federal law65 that the transferee's interest is superior to the interest of
a bona fide purchaser from the debtor against whom the transfer could have
been perfected.
The court cited an Alaska Supreme Court decision 66 holding that the title
of a purchaser at a foreclosure sale relates back to the time of execution of the
deed of trust. Since no purchaser from the debtor could have acquired an
interest superior to the interest created by the deed of trust after its recorda-
1 62. 14 Bankr. 982 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), aff'ad 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982); accord
Calairo v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank (In re Ewing), 36 Bankr. 476 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
The major cases in this area have involved nonjudicial sales conducted pursuant to power of
sale clauses in deeds of trust. See, e.g., Alsop, 14 Bankr. 982. Thus, much of the analysis in this
section of the Article is offered in the context of deeds of trust. The analysis, however, also is
applicable, with minor modifications, to other kinds of foreclosure proceedings and to execution
sales.
63. The court noted that the transfer involved divestiture of the debtor's legal title as well as
his right to possession because a deed of trust merely creates a lien under Alaska law. Application
of the Durrett doctrine is not affected by the particular theory-title, lien, or intermedi-
ate-underlying a state's mortgage law since the debtor will be divested of a sufficient quantum of
rights upon foreclosure to trigger § 548 under each theory. See supra text accompanying note 45.
64. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) (1982) states:
For the purposes of this section, a transfer is made when such transfer becomes so
far perfected that a bona fide purchaser from the debtor against whom such transfer
could have been perfected cannot acquire an interest in the property transferred that is
superior to the interest in such property of the transferee, but if such transfer is not so
perfected before the commencement of the case, such transfer occurs immediately before
the date of the filing of the petition.
65. Perfection or lack of perfection is to be determined by reference to state or nonbank-
ruptcy federal law even though § 548(d)(1) is not explicit on this point. See Lovett v. Shuster, 633
F.2d 98, 104 (8th Cir. 1980).
A similar provision in § 547(e)(1)(A) dealing with the time of transfer for purposes of calcu-
lating the voidable preference period is more explicit by referring to "applicable law." Notwith-
standing their obvious similarities, there are significant differences between the timing rules of
§§ 547 and 548. For a more complete discussion, see 4 W. COLLIER, pra note 27, § 548.08.
66. Alaska Laborers Training Fund v. P & R Enters., 583 P.2d 825 (Alaska 1978).
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tion, the court concluded that the time of transfer for purposes of section 548
was the date of recordation. Since that date was outside the one-year avoid-
ance period, the foreclosure sale could not be avoided. The court further
noted its general disapproval of the Durrett doctrine for many of the reasons
advocated by Judge Clark in his Abramson dissent. 67 It did not, however, in-
dicate that it would decline to follow Durrett in a case in which recordation of
the deed of trust and foreclosure both occurred within the avoidance period.
The Alsop court probably applied section 548(d)(1) incorrectly. From a
conceptual standpoint, execution of a deed of trust is a voluntary conveyance
or transfer of a limited interest in the subject property. This execution creates
a right of foreclosure in the event of default. It may transfer legal title to the
property, or it may merely create a lien.68 The transferee, the trustee under
the deed of trust, can perfect his interest against subsequent purchasers from
the debtor by complying with state law-usually by recording the deed of trust.
If the value of the collateral is exceptionally high in relation to the debt, some
authority suggests that insufficient value has been given and that the transfer-
creation of the voluntary lien--can be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance.
69
Avoidance in this situation would occur irrespective of whether the deed of
trust was recorded. Under section 548, however, the transfer could not be
avoided unless it occurred within one year prior to the commencement of
bankruptcy. Thus, a failure to record could have the effect of bringing an
otherwise exempt transfer forward into the avoidance period.
70
Foreclosure of the deed of trust involves an involuntary conveyance of
the debtor's remaining interest in the property except for a statutory right of
redemption in those states that grant such a right. This involuntary convey-
ance constitutes a separate transfer. The most important rights affected by this
second transfer are the right to possession and the debtor's equity in the prop-
erty, neither of which were conveyed under the deed of trust. When a pur-
67. Alsop, 14 Bankr. at 987.
68. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 49, § 1.6.
69. See, e.g., Busick v. Mandeville, 80 Cal. App. 2d 853, 183 P.2d 362 (1947). There is some
authority that a mere difference in value between the collateral and the secured debt is an insuffi-
cient ground for avoidance. See Downs v. Kissam, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 102 (1850). More often, a
court will acknowledge the avoidability of transfers of excessive security, but will find that in its
specific case the difference in value is insufficient for avoidance. See, e.g., Pereira v. Hope (In re
550 Les Mouches Fashions, Ltd.), 24 Bankr. 509 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also I G. GLENN,
supra note 17, § 296a ("If the debtor puts up more than the next man in line might be required to
deposit, that, in itself, means nothing.").
UFCA § 3(b) deals inferentially with the issue of excessive security by providing that fair
consideration is given "[w]hen such property. . . is received in good faith to secure a present
advance or antecedent debt in amount not disproportionately small as compared with the value of
the property ... obtained." UNUIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANcE AcT § 3(b), 7 U.L.A. 444 (1968).
70. There is an additional benefit to the trustee in bringing the time of transfer forward.
Under § 548(a)(2)(B)(i) the trustee must prove that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the
transfer. He does not have the benefit of a presumption of insolvency. But cf. 11 U.S.C. § 547(0
(1982) (debtor presumed insolvent during 90 days preceding filing of petition). Thus, the closer
the trustee can bring the transfer to the commencement of bankruptcy, the easier it will be to
prove insolvency. "Insolvent" is defined by a balance sheet test. Id § 101(29). For purposes of
determining insolvency, the fair market value of the foreclosed property must be included as an
asset with the value of any liens as liabilities. Cf. id § 101(29)(A)(i) (fair valuation of property
transferred with intent to defraud excluded).
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chaser buys at the foreclosure sale, the deed of trust ordinarily will be
considered discharged; if the purchaser fails to record the trustee's deed, how-
ever, he will not be protected against subsequent bona fide purchasers from
the original debtor. Thus, recordation of the trustee's deed serves a different
purpose from recordation of the original deed of trust because it protects a
different set of rights. In this context, section 548(d)(1) refers to perfection of
the interests acquired at the foreclosure sale, the second transfer, and not to
perfection of the interests conveyed by the deed of trust, the first transfer. If
the purchaser delays in perfecting his interest, the second transfer, like the
first, can be brought forward into the avoidance period.
71
In a sense, the purchaser's title does relate back to the deed of trust. This
is another way of stating the general principle that the purchaser takes free of
any interests that are subordinate to the foreclosing creditor.72 It was in this
limited context that the Alaska Supreme Court had applied the relation-back
71. In a recent article two commentators argue that there is precedent for holding that a
foreclosure is not a separate transfer for bankruptcy purposes. See Coppel & Kahn, Deanging
Durrett: The EstablishedLaw of Transfer, 100 BANKING L.J. 676 (1983). They cite Thompson v.
Fairbanks, 196 U.S. 516 (1905), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the reposses-
sion of collateral subject to an after-acquired property clause in a chattel mortgage was not a
separate transfer for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act's preference provisions. The Court noted
that there was no indication that the debtor gave up possession for the purpose of defrauding
creditors. Id. at 523.
Cases defining transfer for the preference provisions are weak authority for fraudulent con-
veyance cases because the underlying theories are different, even though the impact on the estate
is similar. The preference rules are designed to promote equality of treatment among creditors.
The fraudulent conveyance rules, however, are designed to retain assets for the estate that un-
secured creditors reasonably anticipated would be available for repayment of their debts. See 4
W. COLLIER, supra note 27, § 547.02.
A series of cases have wrestled with the question whether the mere attachment, as opposed to
subsequent foreclosure, of a security interest through an after-acquired property clause is a sepa-
rate transfer for preference purposes. See, e.g., DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969);
Grain Merchants v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 396 U.S. 827
(1969); see also Hogan, Future Goods, Floating Liens, and Foolish Creditors, 17 STAN. L. REv. 822
(1965) (This issue has been resolved under Bankruptcy Code § 547(c)(5), (e)(3).). Even though
DuBay and other cases held that there was no separate transfer, they are not persuasive when
applied to facts like those in Durrett because they deal with the creation of the security interest
and not its enforcement.
Furthermore, when the question is whether the enforcement of a security interest is a separate
transfer, the courts are less likely to scrutinize the definition of transfer in a preference case than
they are in a fraudulent conveyance case. Even if the Supreme Court in Thomps'on had deter-
mined that repossession constituted a separate transfer, it would not have changed the outcome of
the case; the secured creditor would not have received more than he could have received in bank-
ruptcy. A secured creditor who perfects outside the preference period will obtain 100% of his debt,
up to the value of the collateral. Thus, the creditor m Thompson did not gain an advantage vis-a-
vis unsecured creditors by repossessing.
There was, therefore, a valid policy reason for holding that the enforcement of the lien was
irrelevant for preference purposes. There may be policy reasons for holding that the enforcement
of a lien is not a separate transfer for fraudulent conveyance purposes as well, but the policies are
different and the courts should articulate the differences. For cases applying § 547 directly to
completed foreclosures in which the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the debt, see
infra note 110. In any event, this issue has been resolved by an amendment of the definition of
transfer in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333. See supra note 40.
72. The purpose of foreclosure is to give the purchaser "essentially the same title to the land
as that possessed by the mortgagor when the foreclosed mortgage was executed." G. OSBORNE, G.
NELSON, & D. WHITMAN, supra note 49, § 7.12, at 448.
1985]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
doctrine in the case cited by the Alsop court.73 This principle, however, does
not provide a satisfactory basis for fusing the two transfers for purposes of
section 548(d)(1). 74 Section 548(d)(1) should be applied strictly as a mecha-
nism for bringing a transfer, whether voluntary or involuntary, forward into
the avoidance period.
Alsop also is problematic from a policy perspective. The court implied
that it would follow Durrett and set aside a foreclosure sale conducted under a
deed of trust executed within a year prior to bankruptcy if it brought less than
reasonably equivalent value. Although it can be contended that Durrett's at-
tempt to recapture the debtor's equity for the bankruptcy estate creates more
problems than it resolves, there is no reason to differentiate between foreclo-
sure of a recently executed deed of trust and a deed of trust executed more
than a year prior to bankruptcy. Thus, there is an element of capriciousness to
the Alsop approach.
B. In re Madrid
A second case that takes issue with Durrett is Madrid v. Lawyers Title
Insurance Co. (In re Madrid).75 Madrid involved an attack on a nonjudicial
foreclosure of a second deed of trust by a debtor in possession in a Chapter 11
proceeding. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada,
following Durrett, set aside the foreclosure, which brought approximately
sixty-seven percent of the property's fair market value.76 The Bankruptcy Ap-
pellate Panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed.77 In a two-to-one decision, the panel held that a regularly conducted
foreclosure sale itself is a safeguard against fraud and that the law of foreclo-
sures and the law of fraudulent conveyances could be harmonized by "con-
struing the reasonably equivalent value requirement of § 548(a)(2) to mean
the same as the consideration received at a non-collusive and regularly con-
ducted foreclosure sale."'78 The panel, however, did not discuss the transfer
73. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
74. See Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1982), in which the court distinguished between the different interests and concluded:
Section 548(d)(1) does not require the joinder of these two transfers when only one is
challenged under Section 548(a). That the title of the purchaser at a foreclosure sale may
relate back to the recording of the deed of trust is of no concern. The transfer of title in
this case is not questioned; here, the trustee seeks to avoid a transfer of equity in the
property.
Id at 445-46; see also First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Bismarck, Inc. v. Hulm (In re Hulm), 738
F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1984) (foreclosure effects a "transfer" of the debtor's property); Alden, Gross &
Borowitz, supra note 8, at 1608-13 (foreclosure is a transfer under Bankruptcy Code definition).
75. 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984).
76. Madrid v. Del Mar Commerce Co. (In re Madrid), 10 Bankr. 795 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981),
rep'd sub nom Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 725
F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984).
77. Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Madrid (In reMadrid), 21 Bankr. 424 (9th Cir. 1982), afJ'd, 725
F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984).
78. Madria 21 Bankr. at 427; accordMoore v. Gilmore (In re Gilmore), 31 Bankr. 615 (E.D.
Wash. 1983). Judge Volinn dissented, arguing that the majority's construction created a conclu-




The court of appeals affimed, but on different grounds. The court held
that the only relevant transfer occurred when the deed of trust was perfected.
79
This holding differs significantly from A/sop. Even though the Madridholding
since has been rejected by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judge-
ship Act of 1984, Madridwas an improvement on Alsop because the result in a
particular case did not depend on the age of the deed of trust.
The court of appeals specifically stated that it was not relying on a rela-
tion-back doctrine to reach its conclusion, even though the deed of trust had
been recorded more than a year prior to bankruptcy.80 Instead, the court sum-
marized the history of the law of fraudulent conveyances and concluded that
there was no evidence that section 548(a)(2) or its predecessors ever were in-
tended to affect enforcement of a valid lien.81 The court also echoed many of
the concerns stated by Judge Clark in his Abramson dissent, stressing the
"[niegative repercussions" in the lending area and the chilling effect that a
federal right of redemption would have at foreclosure sales.
8 2
In a concurring opinion, Judge Farris agreed that there had not been a
transfer within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code at the foreclosure sale.
8 3
He contended, however, that the majority opinion was overly broad and could
be interpreted as rendering legally irrelevant all conduct occurring after the
deed of trust was recorded. This interpretation would include a collusive fore-
closure engineered by the debtor with intent to defraud other creditors. Thus,
Judge Farris suggested that the definition of transfer be limited in the context
of section 548 to transfers in which the debtor is an active participant.
84
There is a certain logic to the Madrid approach. As already demon-
insulate the foreclosure from attack under § 548. He stated that he would, at most, create a strong
presumption that the price received on foreclosure was reasonably equivalent to the property's
value. Madrid, 21 Bankr. at 428 (Volinn, J., dissenting). The best judicial discussion of the mean-
ing of "reasonably equivalent value" is Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23
Bankr. 434, 441-45 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
79. Madrid, 725 F.2d at 1199. Section 421(i) of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 368 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(48)
(1982)), amends the definition of transfer to include foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemp-
tion. It is unclear whether this signifies congressional approval of Durret, but it probably over-
rules Madrid But see 130 CONG. REc. § 13771-72 (daily ed., pt. II, Oct. 5, 1984) (colloquy
between Senators Dole and DeConcini).
80. Madrid, 725 F.2d at 1199 n.l.
81. Id at 1199-1200. The court concluded that the antecedents of § 548(a)(2) "provide au-
thority for the proposition that conveyances are set aside when there is actual fraud or a situation
indicative of fraud." Id. at 1200.
82. Id at 1202.
83. Id at 1203 (Farris, J., concurring).
84. Judge Farris agreed with Judge Clark's interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act, see supra
note 47, stating that:
Section 67(d) of the prior Bankruptcy Act, virtually identical in all substantive respects
to the present § 548, applied only to "transfers made. . . by debtors." If the language of
§ 548 does not reflect the debtor's active role as clearly as that of its predecessor, the
purpose and origin of the present statute give clarity of meaning to phrases that might
otherwise be ambiguous. I would therefore hold that only transfers where the bankrupt
was a participant can be set aside for absence of "reasonably equivalent value."
Id at 1203-04 (Farris, J., concurring).
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strated, although Durrett is justified by a literal reading of the Bankruptcy
Code, it does not fit easily within the contours of fraudulent conveyance law.
As a matter of construction, it is appropriate to limit a statute's application in a
manner consistent with its historical antecedents.85 Such a construction, how-
ever, is not mandatory and should be adopted only if it is consistent with pol-
icy considerations. The law is a process and an evolution of ideas; to deal with
new situations is commonplace. Durrett promotes one of the basic policies of
bankruptcy law by increasing the potential distribution to unsecured creditors.
This benefit significantly outweighs Durrett's "negative repercussions." Ac-
cordingly, the doctrine should be maintained, although in somewhat modified
form, notwithstanding the fact that it breaks with tradition.
IV. SOME BASIC DISTINCTIONS IN APPLYING DURRE7TTO FORECLOSURES
ON REALTY AND PERSONALTY
The Durrett doctrine has been applied only once to an Article 986 foreclo-
sure. In In re Ewing, 7 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania denied a secured party's motion to dismiss a trustee's
attack on a private foreclosure sale of pledged stock to the issuing corpora-
tion.88 The bankruptcy court rejected an argument based on Alsop and held
that it would set aside the foreclosure sale if further testimony indicated that
the creditor received less than reasonably equivalent value.89 The district
court subsequently accepted the A/sop rationale and reversed the bankruptcy
court's findings. The A/sop rationale, however, is suspect and future cases in-
volving Article 9 foreclosures are likely to follow Durrett. Despite the obvious
similarities, significant differences between real and personal property foreclo-
sures exist.
A. Timing Issues
There are some minor differences in applying the timing rules of section
548(d)(1) to real and personal property. Section 548(d)(1) provides that the
transfer on foreclosure is deemed to take place when it is so far perfected that
a bona fide purchaser from the debtor, against whom the transfer could have
been perfected, cannot acquire an interest superior to that of the transferee. 90
85. See, e.g., Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966), in which the United States Supreme
Court limited the meaning of "transfer" as applied to § 70(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(a)(5) (1976) (repealed 1978).
86. U.C.C. §§ 9-101 to -507 (1978).
87. 33 Bankr. 288 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd, 36 Bankr. 476 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (reversal
based on application of theory from 41sop).
88. Bankruptcy proceedings were initiated under Chapter I land then converted to Chapter 7
proceedings.
89. Ewing, 33 Bankr. at 292.
90. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text. The timing rules for preferential transfers
relate perfection to protection from bona fide purchasers in the case of realty, 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e)(1)(A) (1982), but perfection of an interest m fixtures or personalty occurs "when a credi-
tor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the trans-
feree." Id § 547(e)(1)(B). Section 548(d)(1) does not differentiate between realty and personalty;
the time of transfer in all cases occurs at the time of protection from bona fide purchasers from the
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Unlike the real estate recording system, Article 9 generally does not subject the
buyer at a foreclosure sale to a risk from subsequent purchasers from the
debtor.91 Accordingly, the time of transfer for bankruptcy purposes ordinarily
will correspond to the time of the actual foreclosure sale. Article 9, however,
does apply to sales of accounts and chattel paper,92 and a buyer who fails to
perfect his interest in these types of collateral could be subordinated to a sub-
sequent purchaser from the debtor. Thus, a foreclosure sale outside the avoid-
ance period could be brought forward if the buyer failed to perfect. The
problem is unlikely to arise, however, because a secured party typically will
foreclose on accounts and chattel paper by collecting93 from the account
debtor rather than by sale. In such cases, the secured party already will be
perfected at the time of foreclosure.94 There also could be timing problems
when perfection and the effects of perfection are governed by non-Code provi-
sions that subject the buyer to a risk from subsequent purchasers from the
debtor.
95
B. Overview of Real Property Foreclosures
Aside from minor timing problems, there are significant differences in ap-
plying Durrett to real and personal property foreclosures. Most importantly,
the default provisions of Article 9 are designed to be more protective of the
debtor's interests than the typical state mortgage foreclosure laws. There is no
doubt but that Durrett is in part a reaction to the harsh nature of real property
foreclosure in this country. One of the values of Durrett is that it may stimu-
late a reevaluation and reformation of the foreclosure process.
The mortgagee often is the only party to attend a real property foreclo-
sure sale.9 6 Unlike other parties, however, he has little incentive to bid more
than the amount of the debt. Even when other parties attend, the procedures
debtor. This differing treatment derives in part because a fraudulent transfer by definition cannot
be protected from simple creditors of the debtor. See 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 27, § 548.08, at
548-82 to -83 nn.1-3.
91. "Purchaser" is defined in § 101(35) to mean "transferee of a voluntary transfer, and in-
cludes immediate or mediate transferee of such a transferee." 11 U.S.C. § 101(35) (1982). This
conforms to the definition of purchaser in U.C.C. § 1-201(33), (32) (1978).
92. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102(1)(b), 9-105(l)(m) (1978). A sale of accounts or chattel paper
as part of a sale of the debtor's entire business is also outside the scope of Article 9. Id. § 9-104(f).
93. An assignment by the secured party for purposes of collection is also outside the scope of
Article 9. Id. § 9-104(f).
94. This simply means that the time of transfer cannot be brought forward for bankruptcy
Eurposes. It does not suggest that the foreclosure sale relates back to the original perfection as
eld in Alsop.
95. This could occur when the collateral is a vehicle subject to a state certificate of title act. It
also could occur under federal perfection regimes. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982) (patents); 49
U.S.C. § 1403(c) (1976) (aircraft liens).
96. See Nelson, supra note 49, at 151. Nelson cites several reasons for this phenomenon:
mortgagees can bid up to the amount of the debt without using new money; notice of sale fre-
quently is published in periodicals of limited circulation; notices often are so technical that poten-
tial bidders cannot tell what property is being sold; potential purchasers often have difficulty
inspecting the premises; and purchasers face problems obtaining good and marketable title. Id. at
151-52; see also Lifton, Real Estate in Trouble" Lender's Remedies Need Overhaul, 31 Bus. LAW.
1927 (1976) (statutory redemption right's effect on foreclosure sale participation).
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governing mortgage foreclosures usually ensure that the debtor's equity will be
sacrificed. Sales invariably are conducted by auction rather than by placement
with a qualified broker. Purchasers must pay in cash, further reducing the
bidding pool. Finally, many states grant a statutory, postsale right of redemp-
tion.97 This right of redemption reduces the reliability of the purchaser's title
and further discourages bidders.
Legislative attempts to reform this system have not been successful. One
such attempt is the Uniform Land Transactions Act (ULTA),98 which
provides:
Sale may be at a public sale or by private negotiation, by one or more
contracts, as a unit or in parcels, at any time and place, and on any
terms including sale on credit, but every aspect of the sale, including
the method, advertising, time, place, and terms, must be
reasonable.99
This provision applies to all power-of-sale foreclosures, 100 and to judicial fore-
closures, unless the judgment specifies that the sale is to be held in accordance
with the state's laws governing execution sales of realty.'01 There are no post-
sale rights of redemption under the ULTA,10 2 and there are specific provisions
assuring a good faith purchaser of marketable title even if the mortgagee fails
to comply with the technical foreclosure requirements.'
0 3
If provisions similar to those contained in the ULTA were adopted and
enforced strictly, there might be no need for Durrett. In particular, encourag-
ing private sales on credit could dramatically increase recoveries. One com-
mentator has suggested a system that in some respects goes even further than
the ULTA.' 4 Professor Nelson proposes that for a specified period of time,
property be placed for sale with brokers using ordinary commercial methods,
including descriptive and pictorial advertising. 10 5 To encourage the highest
return, he also suggests a system of public trustees who would place the prop-
erty for sale and whose compensation would be indexed to the excess that the
private sale brings over the mortgage debt. 1' 6 If the property does not sell
within the specified period, this is a strong indication that there is no equity to
recover.
97. See, eg., ALA. CODE, § 6-5-230 (1975); CAL. CIV. CODE § 725a (West 1954); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS § 600.3140 (1963) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.3140 (Callaghan 1980)); Wyo. STAT.
§ 1-480 (Supp. 1975). See generally G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 49,
§ 8.4 (characteristics of statutory redemption).
98. The ULTA was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in August, 1975 and amended substantially in 1977. For a more complete discussion
of its foreclosure provisions, see Kuklin, The Uniform Land Transactions Ad: Aricle 3, 11 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 12 (1976).
99. UNIF. LAND TRANSACIONs AcT § 3-508(a) (1977).
100. Id
101. Id § 3-509.
102. Id § 3-512(a).
103. Id §3-511.
104. See Nelson, supra note 49.
105. .Id at 163.
106. Id at 163-64.
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State legislatures have resisted these attempts at reform and the courts
have been reluctant to intervene. The prevailing judicial attitude is that a sale
will not be set aside unless the price is so low that it "shocks the conscience"
and raises an inference of fraud; 0 7 the debtor is not entitled to avoidance or
monetary damages for mere inadequacy of price.'08 Foreclosures not only
sacrifice the debtor's equity, they also reduce the pool of assets available for
unsecured creditors. These unsecured creditors do not receive notice of the
sale and rarely enter the bidding to protect their investments.
The loss of the debtor's equity conflicts with one of the major goals of
bankruptcy-retention of assets for distribution to unsecured creditors. Prior to
Durrett, bankruptcy courts were powerless in the face of a completed foreclo-
sure sale, 109 even though the effect of a foreclosure was similar to the loss of
assets through preferential transfers.110 The trustee could not set aside the sale
or recover damages from the mortgagee by asserting any rights of the
debtor,' 1' and could not enhance the estate by asserting any of his own powers
or subrogating to the rights of unsecured creditors. The debtor's equity could
107. This is true in both judicial and power-of-sale foreclosures. For a discussion of judicial
foreclosures, see Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U.S. 285 (1907); Wiesel v. Ashcroft, 26 Ariz. App. 490,
549 P.2d 585 (1976); see also G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 49, § 7.16
(judicial and statutory foreclosure sales).
For a discussion of power-of-sale foreclosures, see Jackson v. Klein, 320 S.W.2d 553 (Mo.
1959); Anderson v. Anderson, 107 R.I. 202, 266 A.2d 46 (1970); Pugh v. Richmond, 58 Tenn. App.
62, 425 S.W.2d 789 (1968); see also G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 49,
§ 7.21 (problems in power-of-sale foreclosures).
108. The ULTA, after requiring that all aspects of a foreclosure sale be reasonable, grants the
debtor, or any person entitled to notice, a right to recover money damages from the creditor for
any loss caused by the creditor's failure to observe the standards for foreclosure sales. UNIF.
LAND TRANSACrIONS AcT § 3-513(b) (1977).
109. If foreclosure is incomplete at the time a voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy petition is
filed, the automatic stay prevents enforcement of any lien against property of the estate. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a)(4) (1982). The collateral is property of the estate. Id. § 541(a)(1). If the mortgagee is in
possession, custody, or control of the property, he must turn it over to the trustee unless it is of
inconsequential value. Id. § 542(a). The trustee then can capture the debtor's equity by asserting
his right to use, sell, or lease the collateral. Id. § 363.
110. Two courts have used the preference provisions to avoid foreclosures when the mortgagee
bought in, even though the sales could not have been set aside under state law. See Federal Nat'l
Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 34 Bankr. 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983) (holding
§§ 547(b) and 548(a)(2) applicable to avoid sale); Morris Plan Co. v. Fountain (In re Fountain), 32
Bankr. 965 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (holding § 547 applicable to avoid sale). But cf. Myers v.
Shekter (In re Hill), 39 Bankr. 894 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984) (analogizing to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Madrid).
The application of § 547 in this context is as significant an expansion of that section as Dur-
rett is in the context of § 548. It also is equally problematic since the mortgagee arguably gets no
more than he would have received in bankruptcy proceedings. See I I U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1982).
The mortgagee, however, does obtain the debtor's equity, and the policies that led to these deci-
sions are the same as those underlying Durrett.
Applying § 547 has some attraction since it reduces the avoidance period to 90 days except
for insiders. Id. § 547(b)(4). It can be applied only when the mortgagee is the foreclosure sale
purchaser, since that is the only situation in which the mortgagee will receive more than he would
have received in bankruptcy. Id. § 547(b)(5). It also permits recapture of the debtor's equity
when more than 70% of the property's fair market value was paid at the foreclosure sale. These
features closely parallel some of the modifications of Durrett suggested in this Article.
111. Since the trustee succeeds to "all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as
of the commencement of the case," 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982), he can assert the debtor's right to
any state-created remedy arising out of the foreclosure proceedings. In the real property context,
however, such remedies are rare.
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be recovered only when there was an unexpired right of redemption.' 12
Durrett, however, provides the trustee with a theoretical basis for recap-
turing lost equity. Its effect is to create a de facto federal right of redemption
that is similar to statutory redemption but with some distinguishing features.
First, there is a cost associated with statutory redemption. The redeeming
party must secure sufficient cash to reimburse the foreclosure purchaser's sale
price, plus interest and certain costs. 1 3 There is no out-of-pocket cost associ-
ated with avoidance under Durrett, and the purchaser is reimbursed out of the
proceeds of resale. Second, no existing statutory redemption scheme extends
protection to unsecured creditors.' 14 Thus, Durrett goes further than existing
laws by extending the right of redemption to the representative of such
creditors.
In the roughly twenty-five states that currently permit postsale redemp-
tion, the impact of Durrett will be to increase the risk that the property will be
redeemed; it will not change the nature of the risks assumed by the purchaser.
In those states without statutory redemption, Durrett may have some adverse
impact on participation at foreclosure sales1 15 The benefits to unsecured
creditors, however, outweigh this impact particularly in light of the fact that
the other procedures surrounding foreclosures tend to drive the amounts bid
down to unacceptable levels even when there is no statutory redemption.
There is no reason to permit secured creditors to reap the benefit of assets that
might have paid off unsecured creditors. Ideally, secured lenders would be
required to take reasonable steps to ensure that market value is received for
collateral. If that were the case, there would be no need for either Durrett or
statutory redemption. Given the current state of real property foreclosure
laws, however, Durrett is sound despite its potential impact in nonredemption
states. The solution to "chilled" bidding lies in a structural reform of the sys-
tem, not in a repeal of Durrett.
The extremely long period of uncertainty in Durrett creates problems in
the context of real property." 6 This period is economically wasteful since it
112. The debtor's statutory right of redemption is an asset of the estate. See Harsh Inv. Corp,
v. Bialac (In re Bialac), 24 Bankr. 580 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982); In re Nelson, 9 F. Supp. 657 (D.S.D.
1935); 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 27, § 541.07(3).
The trustee will have at least 60 days to assert the right, even if it otherwise would have
expired after commencement of the case but before the end of the 60-day period. II U.S.C.
§ 108(b)(2) (1982).
In states that grant judicial lien creditors a right of redemption, the trustee could assert such a
right in his capacity as a hypothetical lien creditor even if the mortgagor's redemption period had
expired. Id. § 544(a)(1).
113. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WiirrMAN, supra note 49, § 8.4.
114. See id § 8.5. In some states, creditors who have obtained liens through a judicial process
are entitled to redeem. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 628.3 (West 1949); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 586.23 (West 1947).
115. See McElhone & Cramer, Loan Foreclosure CostsAffectedby Varied State Regulations, 36
MORTGAGE BANKER 41 (1975); Comment, Cost and Time Factors in Foreclosure of Mortgages, 3
REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 413 (1968). The relationship between lost time and th' price received
at foreclosure is discussed in a study sponsored by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. See
TOUCHE, Ross & Co., THE COSTS OF MORTGAGE LOAN FORECLOSURE: CASE STUDIES OF SIX
SAVINGs & LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (1975).
116. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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discourages development of the land until title is secure. A one-year avoid-
ance period prior to bankruptcy may be appropriate when there is actual
fraud, but in the Durrett context it makes more sense to conform to the three-
month limitation period in section 547. There also must be a time limit on the
right to initiate avoidance proceedings following commencement of bank-
ruptcy. One possibility is to establish a separate, nine-month statute of limita-
tions for avoidance of regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sales.
This nine-month limitation period would allow ample time for appointment of
a trustee and would limit the total period of uncertainty to one year following
the foreclosure sale. This conforms to the one-year redemption period avail-
able in many states.117 Other time limits also might be logical, but it is impor-
tant that the period of uncertainty be reduced significantly.
C Overview ofArticle 9 Foreclosures
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which served as the model for
the ULTA foreclosure provisions,118 in theory is more protective of the
debtor's equity in collateral than are real property foreclosure laws. The se-
cured party can "sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collat-
eral" 11 9 so long as "every aspect of the disposition including the method,
manner, time, place and terms"120 is commercially reasonable. A sale may be
conducted by auction or by private proceedings,12 1 although the secured party
generally cannot purchase at a private sale.122 A good faith purchaser's title is
protected from defects in the foreclosure proceedings, 123 and there is no post-
sale right of redemption. 124 Although the secured party may take advantage
of a simplified strict foreclosure proceeding under some circumstances, 125 the
debtor-or another secured party who has requested notice-can protect his eq-
uity by blocking strict foreclosure and forcing a sale.
12 6
The UCC also specifies the manner in which sale proceeds are to be dis-
tributed1 27 and requires that any surplus be turned over to the debtor.
128
Most importantly, the UCC permits the debtor to recover monetary damages
for any loss caused by the secured party's failure to observe the strictures of
117. Although many states that permit redemption have a one-year redemption period, there
is variance from as little as six months to as long as two years. See G. OsnoRNE, G. NnJLsoN & D.
WHrTMAN, supra note 49, § 8.4.
118. See Commissioners' Prefatory Note, UNEF. LAND TRANSACrIoNs AcT (1977).
119. U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (1978).
.120. Id § 9-504(3). A secured party attempting to collect on intangible collateral also must
proceed in a commercially reasonable manner except in cases of nonrecourse financing. Id. § 9-
502(2).
121. Id § 9-504(3).
122. Id The exceptions occur when damages from an unreasonable purchase price are easily
calculable.
123. Id. § 9-504(4).
124. Id § 9-506.
125. Id § 9-505.
126. Id.
127. Id § 9-504(1).
128. Id § 9-504(2).
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part 5 of Article 9.129 Thus, if a secured party holds an auction sale when such
a sale is not commercially reasonable, the debtor has a right to damages for
the difference between the sale price and the price that would have been re-
ceived if the secured party had acted reasonably.
130
The debtor's cause of action can be asserted by the bankruptcy trustee.
This permits the estate to recover some part of the debtor's equity directly
from the offending creditor. In theory, the availability of this remedy makes
Durrett less necessary when personalty is involved. Unfortunately, theory and
reality differ in this instance. Despite the protective tone of Article 9, case law
is replete with instances in which courts have sustained sales as commercially
reasonable even though the collateral brought significantly less than its fair
market value.131 This result is due in large measure to section 9-507(2), which
states that "[t]he fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a
different time or in a different method from that selected by the secured party
is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a commer-
cially reasonable manner."
132
Section 9-507(2) frequently has been cited to support the idea that in Arti-
cle 9 foreclosures, as in real property foreclosures, "mere inadequacy" of price
is insufficient to support a finding that a sale is commercially unreasonable.
133
Generally, Article 9 protects debtors to a significant degree. Nonetheless,
there is no reason to believe that prices at Article 9 foreclosures are so uni-
formly high that application of Durrett would not be beneficial to the bank-
ruptcy estate.
There is a potentially negative aspect to the application of Durrett in the
personal property context. Although there is no redemption period following
foreclosure under Article 9, Durrett creates one. If the protective features of
Article 9 bring proportionately higher prices than the procedures governing
real property foreclosures, there is a greater chance that any "chill" resulting
from Durrell will have a substantial impact. In the absence of any meaningful
empirical studies of the foreclosure process, however, this concern is specula-
tive. Nonetheless, this potential impact suggests that there should be a high
level of protection for third-party purchasers who act in good faith.
129. Id § 9-507(l).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1979; Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Penrose Indus. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Pa.), af'ad 398 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1968).
131. See, e.g., Sierra Fin. Corp. v Brooks-Farrer Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 698, 93 Cal. Rptr. 422
(1971) ($500 price for goods with fair market value of $27,616 held commercially reasonable);
Chicago City Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilson, 86 Ill. App. 3d 452, 407 N.E.2d 964 (1980) (sale of 3-
month-old car for 62% of purchase price held commercially reasonable).
132. U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (1978).
133. See, e.g., Galligan v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Galligan), 10 Bankr. 841
(Bankr. D. Me. 1981); Sierra Fin. Corp. v. Brooks-Farter Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 698, 93 Cal. Rptr.
422 (1971); National Blvd. Bank v. Jackson, 92 IM. App. 3d 928, 416 N.E.2d 358 (1981).
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V. EFFECTS OF THE REMEDIAL SYSTEM
A. Recovery of the Collateralfrom the Lender
There are problems in applying the Bankruptcy Code's remedies for
avoided transactions. When a transfer is avoided under section 548, a pur-
chaser who takes for value and in good faith-the initial transferee-is granted a
lien on the property to the extent of any value given.134 The Chapter 7 trustee
who avoids the transfer will seek to recover the property from the purchaser
under section 550(a) 135 and resell it to realize on the equity. The trustee, how-
ever, can sell free of the purchaser's lien only under limited circumstances; the
most important restriction is that the price obtained by the trustee must be
greater than the value of the purchaser's interest.' 36 The purchaser also is
entitled to "adequate protection" of his interest on request to the bankruptcy
CoUrt. 137 Generally, this means that the purchaser's lien will attach to the pro-
ceeds of the trustee's sale and he will be repaid in full for his investment. 138 In
short, the trustee is given an opportunity to attempt to wring excess value out
of the property. If he cannot obtain a price greater than the value of the pur-
chaser's lien, the property will not be sold and should be abandoned to the
purchaser.
139
This procedure is protective when the initial purchaser is the secured
lender. The only negative aspect is the lost earning potential of the money tied
up in the property from the time of foreclosure to the time the trustee resells.
The section 548(c) lien does not include this amount since it is limited to value
given, and value in this context refers to sums that operate to reduce the
134. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1982). In noncollusive, regularly conducted foreclosure sales the
good faith of the purchaser will not be an issue. Thus, the purchaser will obtain a lien to the
extent of the value given. The elements of value are discussed infra note 137.
135. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1982). SeeS. REp. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5876; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 375-76 (1977)
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6331-32; see also supra note 51.
136. 11 U.S.C. § 363()(3) (1982).
137. Id. § 363(e). The initial purchaser's protection extends beyond the amount paid for the
property. The lien of § 548(c) protects the initial price paid by the purchaser. Value includes
"property, or satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt." Id. § 548(d)(2)(A). Since
the debt will include such items as attorney's fees and the costs of foreclosure in a well-drafted
mortgage or security agreement, the purchaser's lien also will extend to these amounts.
In addition, the purchaser's lien includes the value of improvements to the property made
after the purchase. Id. § 550(d)(1). "Improvement" includes both physical additions or improve-
ments and such items as payment of taxes, discharge of prior liens, and preservation of the prop-
erty. Id. § 550(d)(2). The lien for improvements is limited to the lesser of the actual cost to the
purchaser, less any profits realized therefrom, or any increase in value resulting from the improve-
ments. Id. § 550(d)(1). This limitation creates a disincentive to make improvements that will not
directly increase market value.
If the property is recovered and resold by the trustee, the lien will not fully protect the pur-
chaser since there will be a loss of earning potential on funds tied up in the property. See infra
notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
138. Section 361 suggests a specific method of providing adequate protection. 11 U.S.C. § 361
(1982). The notes of the Committee on the Judiciary following § 363 state that, "most often,
adequate protection in connection with a sale free and clear of other interests will be to have
those interests attach to the proceeds of the sale." S. REP. No. 989, supra note 135, at 56 reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5842.
139. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1982).
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debtor's obligation.140 Moreover, the lost interest is not picked up by section
550(d), which grants a good faith transferee from whom recovery of the prop-
erty is sought a lien to the extent of any improvements made after acquisi-
tion.141 The loss of interest is an economic loss but it does not qualify as an
improvement since it does not enhance the value of the property.
Despite its exclusion from the purchaser's lien, lost interest does not sim-
ply "fall between the cracks" in the Bankruptcy Code. A purchaser with a lien
under either section 548(c) or section 550(d) has a secured claim against the
estate under section 506(a) for the value of the lien. 142 Section 506(b) then
provides that:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property
the value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this
section, is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be al-
lowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any
reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided under the agreement
under which such claim arose. 
143
In the Durrett context, there is by definition excess value in the property; this
provision should protect the lender. Section 506(b) does not specify the rate of
interest; bankruptcy courts undoubtedly have discretion in the matter. Con-
ceptually, one can argue that the effect of avoidance should be a reinstatement
of the contract terms, including the rate of interest. On the other hand, the
amount of the loss in earning potential is a function of the market rate at the
time the loss is incurred and a court reasonably could apply that rate. Even if
the court applied the judgment rate in the particular state, the potential harm
to the creditor would be insignificant compared with the potential benefits to
the estate.14
4
. Recovery of Monetary Damages From the Lender
A different remedy is available when the secured creditor buys in at the
foreclosure sale and subsequently resells the property. If the subsequent trans-
feree has given value, acted in good faith, and has no knowledge of the
voidability of the foreclosure sale, he, or any immediate or mediate good faith
transferee from him, 145 is protected from the trustee by section 550(b), 146 The
trustee, however, can recover the value of the property from the secured credi-
140. Id § 548(c), (d)(2)(A); see also supra note 137.
141. See supra note 137.
142. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982). Section 506(a) states that an allowed claim "is a secured claim
to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in such property." Id The value of the
creditor's interest would be the sum of the liens granted by §§ 548(c) and 550(d).
143. IM § 506(b). Section 506(c) permits the trustee to recover from the property "the reason-
able, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of
any benefit to the holder of such claim." Id § 506(c). Because only expenses that accrue to the
creditor's benefit can be recovered under this section, it does not materially decrease the level of
protection granted under § 506(b).
144. See, eg., Inre Klein, 10 Bankr. 657 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (court used average of con-
tract rate and judgment rate).
145. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(2) (1982). This is an application of the shelter principle.
146. Id. § 550(b).
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tor under section 550(a). This causes no unfairness if the monetary recovery is
measured by the difference between the value of the secured creditor's lien and
the value paid by the subsequent transferee. The procedure is more efficient
than recovery and resale by the trustee, but it does not permit the lender to
recoup from an increased sale price the loss of earning potential that accrues
during the period between his purchase at the foreclosure sale and his subse-
quent resale. As in cases in which the property itself is recovered from the
secured lender, this loss can be compensated by granting the lender credit
under section 506(b).
If the purpose of Durrett is to permit the trustee to recover the debtor's
equity for the benefit of the estate, it is logical that "value" for purposes of
section 550(b) should correspond to the property's fair market value. 147 If this
analysis is accurate, however, there is a potential danger in applying the mone-
tary recovery provision of section 550(a), particularly when moveable items of
personalty are involved. Suppose an Article 9 secured party purchases movea-
ble collateral at a commercially reasonable auction sale for sixty-five percent
of its fair market value. He then resells the property for seventy-five percent
of its fair market value and the purchaser disappears. It would be grossly
unfair to permit the trustee to recover from the secured party the difference
between the price paid at the auction and the property's fair market value,
since this would leave the secured party with an uncompensable loss. This
possibility supports the argument that the trustee's recovery should be limited
to the excess value, less a credit for lost interest, actually received by the se-
cured lender.
148
C. Recovery of the Collateralfrom Third Parties
If value for purposes of section 550(b) means fair market value, the sec-
tion does not fully protect subsequent transferees. Suppose a mortgagee buys
residential real property at foreclosure and then resells the property for less
than its fair market value to a purchaser who intends to live in the home.
Avoidance is unduly burdensome to the purchaser, who would have to give up
his home. Recovering the differential from the ultimate purchaser as mone-
tary damages could be equally burdensome and might lead to insolvency and
loss of the home. Because recovery may lead to irreparable injury, the pur-
chaser should be protected absolutely. The purchaser for residential purposes
147. See Slutsky v. Michel Tire Co. (In re Vann), 26 Bankr. 148 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982);
Federman v. Falcone (In re Nevada Implement Co.), 22 Bankr. 105 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982);
Reiber v. Baker (In re Baker), 17 Bankr. 392 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y 1982). Defining value in this
manner creates a paradox since it exposes a subsequent transferee to liability even though he paid
an amount that, if paid by the initial purchaser, would have been considered reasonably
equivalent under Durrett. Accordingly, an argument can be made that, in the Durrett context,
value for purposes of§ 550(b) means the same as reasonably equivalent value in § 548(a)(2)(A), or
roughly 70% of fair market value. If such a definition is adopted, it becomes even more important
to limit monetary recoveries against initial purchasers under § 550(a) to actual excess value re-
ceived on resale.
148. See Kuhm v. Nance (In re Nance), 26 Bankr. 105 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
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also should be protected if he is the initial purchaser at a regularly conducted
foreclosure sale.
Protection can be accomplished by a statute designating residential pur-
chasers as "protected parties," an idea already embodied in another context in
the ULTA.149 Such a statute resolves one of the problems created by the de
facto right of redemption implicit in Durrett. Since a protected party cuts off
the right of recovery, he should be able to obtain good and marketable title to
the extent currently permitted by state foreclosure procedures. This reduces
his disincentive to bid.
There may be situations other than in the residential context in which a
purchaser of real property would be injured irreparably by application of sec-
tion 550(a). Accordingly, the term "protected party" should be defined
broadly to include residential purchasers and other parties who might suffer
irreparable harm. Because of the significant potential for harm, the trustee
should bear the burden of showing that there will not be irreparable injury.
Blanket protection, however, should not be granted to all purchasers in the
real property context. If the property was purchased for speculative purposes,
recovery of the property or the excess value received on resale by the specula-
tor is entirely appropriate provided he is given the same protections as secured
lenders, including credit for lost interest.' 50
When personal property is purchased by someone other than the secured
party, the best approach may be to deny the trustee a remedy in all cases.
Because the foreclosure mechanism in Article 9 is designed to bring higher
prices than those obtained on sales of realty, a right of redemption could have
a correspondingly greater "chilling" effect on bidding.' 5 ' More importantly,
the greater availability of a damage remedy under UCC section 9-507(l) cre-
ates a greater chance of recovering damages directly from the secured party
without resort to Durrett. It is true that there may be cases in which this ap-
proach leads to a loss of value that otherwise might have been captured, but
the overall benefit to Article 9 debtors justifies this loss. At the very least,
consumer purchasers should be protected parties and other purchasers should
have the advantage of the presumption of irreparable injury.152
149. See UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS AcT § 1-203(a) (1977). ULTA § 1-203(b) defines "resi-
dential real estate" in terms of acreage, dwelling units, and usage. Id. § 1-203(b). A similar defi-
nition should be employed in any new bankruptcy legislation.
150. Subsequent transferees are not protected directly by the lien of§ 548(c), which arises only
"to the extent that such transferee. . . gave value to the debtor in exchange for such transfer." 11
U.S.C. § 548(c) (1982) (emphasis added). The transferee, however, undoubtedly acquires the ini-
tial purchaser's lien. This interpretation is supported by § 550(a), which permits the trustee to
recover only "to the extent" that the transfer is avoided under § 548. See S. REP. No. 989, supra
note 135 reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEws 5787; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 135
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963. The transfer is avoided under § 548(c)
only to the extent of the property's value in excess of the initial purchaser's lien.
151. See supra notes 118-33 and accompanying text.




D. Remedies in Rehabilitation Proceedings
There are additional problems when Durrett is applied in rehabilitation
proceedings under Chapter 11153 or Chapter 13.154 When the property is in
the possession of the lender, recovery of the property for a purpose other than
resale prevents immediate realization of the property's value. The lender,
however, assumed a credit risk when he made the original loan. As long as he
is protected adequately he is no worse off than he would have been if bank-
ruptcy proceedings had been commenced before foreclosure was complete.'
55
When the property has been sold to a third party who has not given sufficient
value to gain protection under section 550(b), however, recovery for use by the
estate converts the purchaser into a forced lender. Even if the purchaser is
"adequately protected" in the sense that he eventually will recoup his invest-
ment plus interest, the consequences of having funds tied up for a significant
period of time can be catastrophic. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Code should
be amended to permit recovery of the collateral from a third-party purchaser
only for the purpose of immediate resale. If the trustee or debtor exercising
the rights of the trustee needs the property to conduct the business, he should
be required to purchase the property outright, even if the purchase money
must be borrowed. Use of the rehabilitation procedures may come too late in
153. Because chapters 1, 3, and 5 of the Bankruptcy Code apply in chapter 11 proceedings, the
trustee may use § 548 to avoid a foreclosure sale. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1982). In addition, a debtor
in possession has all the rights and powers of a trustee. Id. § 1107(a).
154. Section 103(a) also applies chapters 1, 3, and 5 to chapter 13 proceedings and the trustee
no doubt has the power to assert rights granted under § 548. The chapter 13 trustee, however,
usually plays a passive role and the debtor remains in possession of the estate. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1306(b) (1982). The debtor also has the rights granted to the trustee under certain subsections of
§ 363 to use, sell, or lease the property. Id. § 1303. There is no general grant of the trustee's
powers to the debtor.
Some cases have predicated the debtor's power to use § 548 on § 522(h). Under § 522(h), the
debtor may avoid a transfer only if the trustee does not act and only to the extent that the property
could have been exempted under § 522(b) if the transfer by the debtor was not voluntary and the
debtor did not conceal the property. Id. § 522(g)(1). Since neither of these events occur in the
Durrett context, the debtor can use the trustee's powers to salvage his exemption rights to the
equity in mortgaged property. See United Penn Bank v. Dudley (In re Dudley), 38 Bankr. 666
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1984); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 34 Bankr. 818
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); Rosner v. Worcester (In re Worcester), 28 Bankr. 910 (C.D. Cal. 1983);
Coleman v. Home Say. Ass'n (In re Coleman), 21 Bankr. 832 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982); Home Life
Ins. Co. v. Jones (In re Jones), 20 Bankr. 988 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
There is some authority that the debtor has standing to bring an avoidance action directly
under § 548 without using the detour of § 522(h). The argument is based on 11 U.S.C. § 1306
(1982), which includes in the chapter 13 estate all property designated in 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982).
Section 541(a)(3) specifies property that the trustee recovers under § 550. Because of the passive
nature of the chapter 13 trustee, a recovery right in the debtor could be inferred from these provi-
sions since property that is technically part of the estate otherwise will be lost. See Carr v.
Demusis (In re Carr), 34 Bankr. 653 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983); Russo v. Ciavarella (In re
Ciavarella), 28 Bankr. 823 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
If the debtor recovers the property under § 522(h), his ability to claim an exemption is subject
to the limitations of § 550. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (i)(1) (1982). The purchaser's lien therefore is effective
and can cut off the debtor's exemption rights.
155. For a discussion of the extent to which the concept of adequate protection requires the
maintenance of an "equity cushion" in the property to absorb lost expenses, see Weintraub &
Resnick, Puncturing the Equity Cushion-Adequate Protectionfor Secured Creditors in Reorganiza-
tion Cases, 14 U.C.C. L.J. 284 (1982).
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some circumstances; that the debtor could have protected himself by initiating
bankruptcy before the foreclosure was complete cannot be ignored.
E. Application of the Seventy Percent Rule
In its present form, Durrett may not go far enough in empowering the
trustee to avoid foreclosure sales. There is little justification for a system that
permits a secured lender-or a subsequent, unprotected purchaser-to acquire
and retain the debtor's equity without compensation; under current foreclo-
sure laws, however, this result frequently occurs. Durrett is triggered only
when the foreclosure sale price is less than seventy percent of the property's
fair market value; thus, up to thirty percent of that value can be lost. Although
invariably there will be costs associated with an effort to obtain market value
for collateral, the present system still may result in an unjustifiable sacrifice of
equity.
Suppose real property with a fair market value of $300,000 is sold at fore-
closure to the lender for seventy percent of that amount, $210,000. Under
Durrett, the sale is final. The lender can resell the property for $300,000 and
pocket a significant portion of the debtor's equity. If the property is placed
with a broker who charges a 7 percent commission, the lender's profit is only
reduced by $21,000. In addition, the lender will have $210,000 tied up in the
property during the resale period. Assuming a 12 percent market rate of inter-
est, he will be losing approximately $2,100 per month. There also will be clos-
ing costs associated with the resale. Even with these costs, however, the lender
or a subsequent purchaser will capture a significant profit. There is no reason
why this profit should not be available to unsecured creditors.
Accordingly, the definition of "reasonably equivalent value" in section
548(a)(2) should not be limited by a seventy percent rule. The phrase, how-
ever, also should not be construed as the equivalent of fair market value. In-
stead, the test for avoidance should be whether it is likely to result in a
substantial benefit to the estate, with the burden on the trustee to show the
potential for such benefit. The bankruptcy judge then would consider such
factors as the actual costs of resale and the lost earning potential of the lender
to determine whether avoidance was appropriate. If the other modifications
suggested in this Article are adopted, such an approach should increase the
return to the estate without significant prejudice to the lender since the trustee
will be forced to abandon the sale if his expectations are not satisfied.' 56
Bankruptcy judges can further minimize the risks by setting reasonable time
limitations on the trustee's resale efforts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the opposition it has engendered, Durrett represents an
improvement in the law. Any negative effect that it may have on foreclosures
is outweighed by its benefit to unsecured creditors, particularly in light of the
156. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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low prices traditionally generated at real property foreclosures. The real estate
bar's energies would be better spent urging fundamental reforms in foreclo-
sure laws, a process that could render Durrett irrelevant.
Despite the differences in foreclosure procedures, there is reason to be-
lieve that Durrett also will be beneficial when applied to personalty, particu-
larly when the remedies are invoked against secured lenders. Durrett,
however, is a blunt instrument forged from statutes that were not drafted with
such a doctrine in mind. To avoid inequities and to increase its potential to
benefit bankruptcy estates, the instrument should be honed by remedial legis-
lation. Although legitimate debate over the necessary degree of modification
exists, the following specific steps are recommended:
1. Reduce the prebankruptcy avoidance period for noncollusive,
regularly conducted foreclosure proceedings to three months;
2. Adopt a nine-month statute of limitations following the com-
mencement of bankruptcy for bringing an avoidance action;
3. Abandon the seventy percent rule and permit avoidance when-
ever the trustee can persuade the court that there will be a substantial
benefit to the estate;
4. Clarify section 550(a) by limiting monetary awards to the
amount that a purchaser's resale price exceeds the amount of his lien
plus interest;
5. Adopt a provision classifying as a "protected party" any person
who in good faith pays fair market value for collateral, purchases
real estate primarily for use as his own residence, purchases personal
property, and any other good faith party who will be injured irrepa-
rably by application of a remedy-with a presumption of irreparable
injury in favor of all parties except the foreclosing creditor; and
6. In rehabilitation proceedings, prohibit recovery of collateral
from unprotected parties, other than the secured lender, for any pur-
pose except immediate resale.
Adoption of these proposals should leave bankruptcy trustees with a powerful
new tool to protect unsecured creditors and simultaneously minimize the neg-
ative aspects of Durrett.
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